

Russia's new cruise missiles: a game changer?



Alexandre SHELDON-DUPLAIX,
Service historique de la défense

Russia's first use of seaborne land attack cruise missiles

- On 7 October 2015, the Caspian Flotilla's Gepard class frigate and three Buyan-M class corvettes, launched 26 Kalibr-NK cruise missiles (3M14T) at 11 targets in Syria. The missiles traveled 1,500 km (932 mi) through Iranian and Iraqi airspace and struck targets in the Idlib province (controlled by the Free Syrian Army and the Al Qaeda/Al Nusra front). The US claimed that 4 missiles had failed but no evidence was given and Iran denied. https://youtu.be/vPu_RL7Ncao
- On 20 November the Caspian flotilla launched 18 more missiles against Raqqa, Idlib and Aleppo.
- On 9 December, Russia fired 4 KALIBR-PL (3M14K) cruise missiles from the KILO submarine B-237 *Rostov-on-Don* in the Mediterranean.
- On 19 August 2016 two Black Sea corvettes deployed in the Mediterranean launched three Kalibr-NK cruise missiles against al-Nusra targets near Aleppo
- On 20 September Russian state media reported that Russian warships in the Mediterranean fired three Kalibr-NK missiles at western Aleppo, near Mount Simeon.



★ Пункт материально-технического обеспечения ВМФ России
▲ Авиабазы «Хмеймим» — место локализации российских ВКС
✦ Места ударов российского ВМФ

The KALIBR (Калибр) land-attack/anti-ship missile (SS-N-27B SIZZLER)

- 3M54K: anti-submarine launched [length : 8.22 m (27.0 ft.), with a 200 kg (440 lb.) warhead; range: 440–660 km (270–410 mi); sea-skimmer with supersonic terminal speed (Mach 2.9) and a flight altitude of 4.6 meters (15 ft.)]
- 3M54T: anti-ship launched (VLS); [length: 8.9 m (29 ft), with a 200 kg (440 lb.) warhead; range: 440–660 km (270–410 mi)]
- 3M14K: inertial guidance land attack submarine-launched [length: 6.2 m (20 ft), 450 kg (990 lb) warhead; range: 1,500–2,500 km (930–1,550 mi); subsonic terminal speed: Mach 0.8].
- 3M14T: Inertial guidance land attack ship launched (VLS) missile, thrust vectoring booster [length: 8.9 m (29 ft), its warhead weight and other performance are the same as the 3M14K. Russia fired 26 3M14T cruise missiles from four surface ships in the Caspian Sea against 11 targets in Syria on 7 October 2015.



Pr. 21631



bastion-karpenko.ru/index/

The BUYAN MOD Sea-river corvettes, a true LCS



bastion-karpenko.ru/index/



bastion-karpenko.ru/index/

The intimidating “KALIBR diplomacy”: President Putin showing the new land-attack missile to his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev ...who looked uneasy

- Baku, August 13th, 2013
- The Russian KALIBR fitted corvettes also visited the Iranian port of Bandar-E-Anzali in October 2014 to demonstrate their new capabilities



The meaning of the cruise missile strikes on Syria: the opinion of a Russian presidential adviser

- For analyst Vladimir Kozin, adviser to the Russian presidency, the strikes carried out by four corvettes from the Caspian Sea were not necessary for the military operations in Syria. They just served "to demonstrate the technical superiority of Russia over NATO" ; Kozin further explained that the demonstration also proved the vulnerability of the US anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) infrastructures in Romania or Poland to cruise missile strikes




The meaning of the cruise missile strikes on Syria: the opinion of a British Army retired brigadier

- Brigadier Ben Barry (rtd) from IISS in London writes: *“There is an element of demonstrating capability in order to gain strategic leverage more widely... **If they want to deter what they consider to be adventurism from an irresponsible Nato, then it helps to show they’ve got the capability to fire cruise missiles from both surface warships and submarines... This helps to justify to the Russian public the sort of resources that have been put into military modernization...If I was a Russian staff officer, I’d be saying ‘this does have a deterrent effect – Nato is going to sit up and take notice of this’”.***
- The real goal is to seize Western attention. Having increased Russian military spending by at least 50 per cent since 2005, Russia wants to pretend to be on a par with the US.



The reality of Russia's Cruise Missiles Capabilities: an optical/political illusion ... so far...they **CANNOT COMPARE WITH THE USN**

- Russia has about 13 platforms confirmed to be capable of launching KALIBR cruise missiles: 1 Project 885 SSN, the *Severodvinsk* (8 silos and 24 missiles), 3 new KILO SSKs, 1 LADA SSK, 3 frigates (Project 22350 and a 2 Project 11356), 2 corvettes (1 Project 1161K and 1 Project 20385) 6 corvettes Project 21631, each with eight missiles. **In total, Russia can fire 24 KALIBR from a single SSN, and more than 100 KALIBR from 10 surface ships and 4 submarines.** More may be deployed on the latest of 13 SSBNs, 26 SSGN/SSNs, 18 SSKs and 4 surface ships.
- **By comparison, the USN can launch more than 5000 cruise missiles from more than 80 surface ships and 50 submarines including four dedicated OHIO SSGN with 154 each**




A surprise that should not have been a surprise: all Russian anti-ship missiles currently in service are still Cold War programs for a “missile Navy” that did not have shipborne attack bombers

Soviet Russian anti-ship missiles (with secondary land attack roles)

| Conception | NATO designation | Soviet/Russian designation | Size/Shape | Range, km | Speed, Max | Length m | Diameter m | Weight kg | Explosive kg | Targeting | Platforms |
|-----------------------|---|--|--|-------------|------------|----------|------------|-----------|--|--|-----------------|
| 1955-60 |  SS-N-2 <i>Styx</i> | <i>П-15 Термит</i> |  | 80 | 0,95 | 6,5 | 0,76 | 2523 | 513 | <i>Inertial/Active radar homing/IR</i> | Surf/cb |
| 1959-68 |  SS-N-7 <i>Starbright</i> | <i>П-70 Аметист</i> |  | 80 | 0,95 | 7 | 0,55 | 3650 |  1000 | <i>Inertial/Active radar homing</i> | Submarine |
| 1958-68 |  AS-4 <i>Kitchen</i> | <i>Х-22 Буря</i> | | 600 | 3,5-4,6 | 11,67 | 0,92 | 5780 |  1000 | <i>Inertial/Active radar homing</i> | Aircraft |
| 1969-74 |  SS-N-12 <i>Sandbox</i> | <i>П-500 Базальт</i> |  | 550 | 2,5 | 11,7 | 0,88 | 4800 |  1000 | <i>Inertial/Active radar homing</i> | Surface |
| 1969-83 |  SS-N-19 <i>Shipwreck</i> | П-700 Гранит |  | 625 | 2,5 | 10 | 0,85 | 7000 |  750 | <i>Inertial/Active radar homing</i> | Surf/sub |
| 1977- not accepted |  SS-N-24 <i>Scorpion</i> | <i>П-750 Метеорит</i> |  | 5500 | 3 | 12,8 | 0,9 | 6380 |  1000 | <i>Inertial/Active radar homing</i> | Air/sub/surf/cb |
| 1973-84 |  SS-N-22 <i>Sunburn</i> | П-270 Москит |  | 240 | 2,8 | 9,75 | 0,76 | 4450 | 320 | <i>Inertial/Active radar homing</i> | Air/surf/cb |
| 1979-87 |  | П-1000 Вулкан |  | 700 | 2,5 | 11,7 | 0,88 | 5800 |  1000 | <i>Inertial/Active radar homing</i> | Surface |
| 1975-89 |  AS-17 <i>Krypton</i> | Х-31 АД | | 160 | 3,1 | 5,34 | 0,36 | 715 | 110 | <i>Inertial/Active radar homing</i> | Aircraft |
| 1983-93 |  SS-N-27B <i>Sizzler</i> | 3М-54Э «Калибр» |  | 220 | 0,8-2,9* | 8,22 | 0,533 | 2300 | 200 | <i>Inertial/Active radar homing</i> | Air/surf/sub/cb |
| |  SS-N-27B <i>Sizzler</i> | 3М-54Э1 «Калибр» | | 300 | 0,8 | 6,2 | 0,533 | 1800 | 400 | <i>Inertial/Active radar homing</i> | Surf/sub/cb |
| 1980s-93 |  SS-N-25 <i>Switchblade</i> | Х-35 «Уран» Х-35У 3М-24 |  | 130-260 | 0,85 | 4,4 | 0,42 | 520-560 | 145 | <i>Inertial/Active radar homing/IR</i> | Air/surf/cb |
| 1970s-2002 |  SS-N-26 <i>Strobile</i> | П-800 «Оникс» |  | 500-300-120 | 2,6 | 8 | 0,67 | 3000 | 300 | <i>Inertial/Active radar homing</i> | Air/sub/surf/cb |

The P-800 ONYX 3M55/П-800 Оникс supersonic anti-ship cruise missile (SS-N-26 STROBILE)

- The P-800 ONYX 3M55/П-800 Оникс (SS-N-26 STROBILE), known as the YAKHONT/BASTION (Яхонт) for exports, is a supersonic anti-ship cruise missile developed by NPO Mashinostroyeniya as a ramjet missile with an air launched Kh-61 variant, replacing P-270 MOSKIT (SS-N-22) and P-700 GRANIT (SS-N-19).
- The P-800 serves as the basis for the joint Russian-Indian supersonic missile BRAHMOS.



KALIBR/ONYX/URAN can also be fired from coastal batteries and KALIBR/URAN can be fitted on a number of platforms in asymmetrical scenarios

- Merchant ships
- Landing ships...
- Trains, trucks...



| РАЗМЕЩЕНИЕ | | ВООРУЖЕНИЕ | |
|--|--|---|--|
| <p>Размещение в стандартном 20- и 40-футовом морском контейнере. Благодаря чему он становится практически незаметным для любых видов воздушной и технической разведки.</p> | <p>Объем: 33 м³ Допустимая нагрузка: 21 920 кг</p> | <p>Объем: 67 м³ Допустимая нагрузка: 26 930 кг</p> | <p>ЗМ-54Э Длина: 8,72 м Скорость полета: 0,8 М Диаметр: 355 мм Взвешивание: 200 кг Траектория: 20 м Дальность: 220 км</p> |
| <p>МОДУЛЬ ВОЕВОГО УПРАВЛЕНИЯ</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Поддержка обслуживания и ремонтные процедуры • Прием ЦУ и команд на выполнение стрельбы • Расчет позиций для стрельбы • Проведение предстартовой подготовки • Выработка полетного задания и передача ракет | <p>УНИВЕРСАЛЬНЫЙ СТАРТОВЫЙ МОДУЛЬ</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Система управления стрельбой • Подготовка к запуску вертолетного или самолетного старта • Автоматизированное управление, связь с радаром • Система ЭЦП/ЭЦС/ЭЦСВ, взаимодействие с ЦУ | <p>МОДУЛЬ ЭНЕРГОПИТАНИЯ И АККУМУЛЯТОРНЫЙ</p> <p>Предназначен для размещения в нем источников электроэнергии и других средств и систем, которые обеспечивают надежность функционирования контейнера и выходные или поставленные задачи.</p> | <p>ЗМ-54Э1 Длина: 8,72 м Скорость полета: 0,8 М Диаметр: 355 мм Взвешивание: 400 кг Траектория: 20 м Дальность: 300 км</p> |
| | | | <p>ЗМ-14Э Длина: 8,20 м Скорость полета: 0,8 М Диаметр: 355 мм Взвешивание: 200 кг Траектория: 20 м Над скоростью: 50-150 м/с Дальность: 300 км</p> |



15 years of exports and technology transfers:
India, China, Vietnam, Indonesia...


Export versions of KALIBR (CLUB) and ONYX (BASTION) already in service with Algeria, India, Vietnam, China; and Syria, Vietnam and Indonesia, in the anti-shipping role with a potential for land-attack

- Algeria: 'Club-S' on 4 KILO submarines.
- India: 'Club-S' and 'Club-N' on several KILO submarines and TALWAR class frigates
- Vietnam: 'Club-S' on 6 KILO submarines.
- China: 'Club-S' on probably 8 of 12 KILO submarines
- Syria apparently received 2 BASTION missile systems (36 missiles each/72). In May 2013, Russia may have delivered more missiles. The warehouse containing the BASTION Missile may have been destroyed in an Israeli air strike on Latakia (5 July 2013), but some missiles may have been removed before.
- India and Vietnam field the joint Indo-Russian BRAHMOS, a version of BASTION.



Russia's capabilities: 2017-22: is there a resurgent Russian naval threat? **Not exactly: the numbers are still going down but Russia is compensating the decline of its OOB with the deployment of cruise missiles**


Spectacular decline of the Russian Navy, losing the second rank to the Chinese Navy



SSBN (59)



6 Project 941 Akula NATO: *Typhoon*
TK-840, TK-816, TK-830, TK-806, TK-823, TK-834



18 Project 667B Murena NATO: *Delta I*
K-279, K-447, K-450, K-385, K-457, K-465, K-460, K-472, K-475, K-171
K-386, K-417, K-477, K-497, K-500, K-512, K-523, K-530

3 Project 667BD Murena-M NATO: *Delta II*

K-182, K-92, K-421

13 Project 667BDR Kalmar NATO: *Delta III*
K-441, K-449, K-455, K-490, K-487, K-496, K-506, K-211, K-223, K-180
K-433, K-129, K-44

9 Project 667BDRM Delfin NATO: *Delta IV*

K-51, K-84, K-84, K-114, K-117, K-407



9 Project 667A Navaga NATO: *Yankee*

K-537, K-420, K-403, K-245, K-214, K-241, K-444, K-258


4 Project 667AD Nalim NATO: *Yankee*

K-446, K-451, K-435, K-430

1 Project 658 NATO: *Hotel*

K-149

SSN (64)



12 Project 671 Yorsh NATO: *Victor I*
K-38, K-69, K-147, K-53, K-306, K-323, K-370, K-438, K-367, K-398
K-462, K-481

2 Project 671V Yorsh NATO: *Victor I*
K-454, K-469

8 Project 671RT Syomga NATO: *Victor II*
K-387, K-371, K-467, K-488, K-505, K-495, K-513, K-517

22 Project 671RTM Shchuka NATO: *Victor III*
K-524, K-254, K-502, K-527, K-298, K-358, K-299, K-244, K-247, K-507
K-251, K-255, K-324, K-355, K-360, K-218, K-242, K-492, K-412, K-305
K-264, K-315

4 Project 671RTMK Shchuka NATO: *Victor III*
K-292, K-388, K-138, K-414



7 Project 971 Shchuka-B NATO: *Akula*
K-480, K-317, K-284, K-263, K-322, K-391, K-331

2 Project 945 Barrakuda NATO: *Sierra I*
K-239, K-276

1 Project 705K Lira NATO: *Aifa*
K-123

6 Project 627A Kit NATO: *November*

SSBN (13)



1 Project 941 Akula NATO: *Typhoon*
TK-208 Dmitry Donskoy 824

3 Project 667BDR Kalmar NATO: *Delta III*
K-223 Podolsk, K-433 Svyatoy Georgiy Pobedonosets, K-44 Ryazan
6 Project 667BDRM Delfin NATO: *Delta IV*
K-51 Verkhurye, K-84 Ekaterinburg, K-18 Karelia, K-114 Tula
K-117 Bryansk, K-407 Novomoskovsk




3 Project 955 Borey NATO: *Borei*
K-535 Yury Dolgorukiy, K-550 Alexandr Nevskiy
K-551 Vladimir Monomakh



SSN (17)

4 Project 671RTMK Shchuka NATO: *Victor III*
B-388 Petrozavodsk, B-138 Obninsk, B-414 Daniil Moskovskiy
B-448 Tambov




9 Project 971 Shchuka-B NATO: *Akula*
K-317 Pantera, K-331 Magadan, K-419 Kuzbass, K-461 Volk
K-328 Leopard, K-154 Tigr, K-295 Samara, K-391 Bratsk
K-157 Vepr

1 Project 09711 NATO: *Akula III*
K-335 Gepard

2 Project 945A Barrakuda NATO: *Sierra II*
K-534 Pskov, K-336 Nizhny

SSGN (58)




2 Project 949 Granit NATO: *Oscar I*
K-525, K-206

6 Project 949A Antey NATO: *Oscar II*
K-148, K-173, K-132, K-119, K-410, K-442



6 Project 667AT NATO: *Yankee Notch*
K-253, K-395, K-411, K-423, K-420, K-403




8 Project 670 Skat NATO: *Charlie I*
K-43, K-25, K-143, K-313, K-308, K-302, K-325, K-429


6 Project 670M Chayka NATO: *Charlie II*

SSK (59)


Project 877 Paltus NATO: *Kilo*
B-445, B-459, B-464, B-471, B-494, B-800, B-871, B-808, B-177, B-806
B-340, B-190, B-227, B-260, B-345, B-394, B-402, B-248



Project 641B Som NATO: *Tango*
B-443, B-474, B-437, B-498, B-515, B-519, B-519, B-290, B-303, B-146
B-546, B-30, B-215, B-398, B-307, B-319, B-225, B-312, B-380



16 Project 651 NATO: *Juliett*
K-156, K-85, K-70, K-24, K-77, K-81, K-68, K-63, K-58, K-73
K-67, K-78, K-203, K-304, K-318, K-120



14 Project 675 NATO: *Echo II*
K-1, K-7, K-22, K-28, K-35, K-48, K-56, K-125, K-128, K-131

SSGN (6)




6 Project 949A Antey NATO: *Oscar II*
K-150 Tomsk, K-442 Chelyabinsk, K-186 Omsk
K-119 Voronezh, K-410 Smolensk, K-456 Vilyuchinsk



1 Project 885 Yasen NATO: *Graney*
K-560 Severodvinsk

SSK (20)




12 Project 877 Paltus NATO: *Kilo*
B-260 Chita, B-227 Vyborg, B-402 Volgda
B-445 Svyatoy Nikolay Chudotvorets, B-808 Yaroslavl
B-464 Ust'-Kamchatsk, B-459 Vladikavkaz, B-471 Magnitogorsk
B-494 Ust'-Bolsheretsk, B-177 Lipetsk, B-190 Krasnokamensk
B-345 Mogocho
1 Project 877EKM Paltus NATO: *Kilo*
B-806 Dmitrov
1 Project 877LPMB Paltus NATO: *Kilo*
B-800 Kaluga
1 Project 877V Paltus NATO: *Kilo*
B-871 Altosa
4 Project 86363 Paltus NATO: *Improved Kilo*
B-261 Novorossiysk, B-237 Rostov na Donu, B-262 Stary Oskol
B-265 Krasnodar


1 Project 677 Lada NATO: *Lada*
B-585 Sankt-Peterburg

Project 641 NATO: *Foxtrot*
B-36, B-57, B-116, B-143, B-4, B-153, B-164, B-33, B-105, B-50
B-31, B-2, B-55, B-101, B-6, B-15, B-103, B-109, B-107, B-25
B-21, B-9, B-26, B-28, B-34, B-40, B-41, B-46, B-49, B-39
B-397, B-400, B-413, B-416, B-205, B-213, B-440, B-409, B-427


CV (7)



CGHMN (3)



CV (1)



CGHMN (1) + 1 (refit) +1 (reserve)



CGHM (30)



CGHM (3)



CGHM (3)



DDGHM/DDGM (45)



DDGHM/DDGM (14)




FFGHM (122)



FFGHM/FFGM (10)



FSGM/FSM/PCFG (168)



13 Project 12411T Molniya-1 NATO: Tarantul
 Kaliningradskiy komsomolets 625, Kirovskiy komsomolets 820, Poltavskiy komsomolets 956
 R-4 800, Krasnodarskiy komsomolets 965, Kuybiskhevskiy komsomolets 964, R-101 729, R-129
 R-257 833, R-42 835, R-45 919, R-69, R-79
1 Project 12417 NATO: Tarantul
 R-71 962
23 Project 12411 NATO: Tarantul
 R-49 960, Tambovskiy komsomolets 835, R-60 955, Poltavskiy komsomolets 965
 R-187, R-230, R-234, R-109, R-69 947, R-85 938, R-103, R-113, R-158, R-76
 R-83 980, R-229 975, R-230 985, R-240 938, R-261 943, R-271
 R-442 999, R-297, R-298



12 Project 1231M NATO: Parchim
 MPK-192 247, MPK-205 223, MPK-67 242
 MPK-99 255, MPK-105 245, MPK-213 222
 MPK-216 071, MPK-219 209, MPK-224 218
 MPK-227 243, MPK-228 244, MPK-229 232
 (as of 1990)

18 Project 1234 Ovod NATO: Neuschek IV
 Burya 824, Burya 432, Vityaz 436, Vityaz 899
 Ovod 592, Ovod 618, Ovod 623, Zvezda 621
 Molniya 585, Sakhal 501, Zarya 511, Mael 510
 Ovod 577, Priblizh 564, Tselin 600, Tselin 600 (as of 1990)
13 Project 12341 Ovod-I NATO: Akavukha M
 Burya 569, Vityaz 572, Komsomolets Mordovi 620, Ayvberg 535
 Tselin 604, Siroguz 647, Priblizh 600, Priblizh 602
 Molniya 617, Molniya 900, Razval 636, Zvez 568
 Ovod 595, Priblizh 570, Siroguz 600, Tselin 618
 Mael 600 (as of 1990)
9 Project 12347 NATO: Neuschek IV
 Mael 520 (as of 1990)



27 Project 1124 Albatros NATO: Grisha I
 MPK-147 071, MPK-9 112, MPK-131, MPK-133, MPK-33 129
 MPK-47 104, MPK-3 106, MPK-8 052, Odesskiy komsomolets 094
 MPK-40 110, MPK-100 162, MPK-14 112, MPK-152 175
 MPK-61 248, MPK-2 225, MPK-104 074, MPK-108 221
 MPK-48 059, MPK-02 186, MPK-31 122, Komsomolets Grizi 078
 MPK-6 073, Komsomolets Lening 210, MPK-50 271, MPK-41 202
 MPK-117 329, MPK-81 382, MPK-122 348, MPK-143 303, MPK-145 312
 MPK-170 237, MPK-4 305, Zapovednyy komsomolets 349
 MPK-188 289, MPK-37 206, MPK-178 333, MPK-190 327 (as of 1990)


32 Project 1124M NATO: Grisha II
 Kavkazskiy komsomolets 084, Komsomolets Molniya 071, MPK-120 125, MPK-190 156
 Komsomolets Arsenal 055, MPK-202 145, MPK-113 171, MPK-207 055, MPK-217 054
 Leningradskiy komsomolets 162, MPK-82, MPK-95, MPK-142 161, MPK-190 131, MPK-69 127
 Dneprovskiy komsomolets 162, MPK-106 113, MPK-162 195, Yung 148, Arkhangel'skiy komsomolets 118
 MPK-56 159, MPK-7 067, MPK-10 083, MPK-14 060, MPK-26, MPK-260 369
 MPK-6 216, MPK-222 328, MPK-28 207, Vostochnyy komsomolets 342, MPK-84, MPK-17 (as of 1990)
11 Project 1124P NATO: Grisha M
 Molniya 214, Zhovtyy 848, Izrael 822, Rabot 026, Anskiy, Orlov 810
 Gagarin 036, Izrael 011, Pechory 050, Pechory 076, Nadezhdy 047, Dneprov 889 (as of 1990)
6 Project 11124 NATO: Grisha JV
 Grisha 010, Bezzachornyy 014, Zerk 058, Reshchiny 087, Svel 052
 (as of 1990)



2 Project 1124 Albatros NATO: Grisha I
 Aleksandrovets 039, Kholmik 369
16 Project 1124M NATO: Grisha JV/V
 Monometa 054, Suzdal'skiy 071, Koryeyets 390, Kasimov 055, Metel
 MPK-82 375, Ust-limsk 362, Monchegorsk 190, Smezhnogradsk 191
 Povodino 053, Eysk 054, Brest 195, Naryan-Mar 138
 Sovetskaya Gavan 350, Yung 113, MPK-221 354
 MPK-107 332, Omega 164



FSGM/FSM/PCFG (68) LST (42)




7 Project 1201M NATO: Parchim
 MPK-160 204, Kazanka 315, Zvezdosudok 508
 MPK-105 245, Anshan 218, MPK-227 243
 Kalyniya 232




3 Project 12631 Buyan-M NATO: Buyan-M
 Grad Sviyazhsk 021, Uglich 022, Veliky Ustug 023, Zeleny Dol 602
 Serpukhov 603


12 Project 12341 Ovod-I NATO: Neuschek IV
 Siroi 620, Ayvberg 535, Mael 617, Zvez 560, Geyzer 555
 Priblizh 570, Liven 551, Nauch 450, Irey 418, Kozlov 520
 Siroguz 420, Mnoz 409
1 Project 12347 NATO: Neuschek IV
 Mael 520



4 Project 12611M Molniya-1 NATO: Tarantul
 R-79 950, Shapoval 700, Kuznetsov 852, R-257 833
1 Project 12417 NATO: Tarantul
 Shyza 992
26 Project 12411 NATO: Tarantul
 R-47 819, R-40 860, MAK-160 004, Zvezdnyy 858, Ivanova
 R-100 962, R-229 993, R-261 991, R-297 991, R-248 971
 Dneprovgrad 825, R-11 949, R-14 924, Mambak 874
 R-18 857, R-19 878, R-20 821, R-24 846, R-2 870, R-28 81




3 Project 1174 Nosorog NATO: Ivan Rogov
 Ivan Rogov 113, Alexandr Nikolaev 057, Mifrofan Moskalenko 016
 (as of 1990)



11 Project 775 NATO: Ropucha
 SDK-47 134, SDK-48 061, SDK-63 083, SDK-90 058
 SDK-91 025, SDK-181 083, SDK-182 040, SDK-183 021
 SDK-197 055, SDK-200 011, SDK-55 014
 (as of 1990)

13 Project 775/II NATO: Ropucha II
 BDK-14 050, BDK-101 081, BDK-105 103, BDK-98 058
 BDK-32 018, BDK-43 127, BDK-58 102, BDK-45 036
 BDK-56 154, BDK-60 110, BDK-64 158, BDK-46 142
 BDK-67 156 (as of 1990)


1 Project 775/III NATO: Ropucha II
 BDK-54 (as of 1990)



14 Project 1171 Tapir NATO: Alligator
 BDK-10 150, BDK-6 151, BDK-13 093, BDK-62 030
 BDK-66 085, BDK-69 150, BDK-77 099, Doneckiy shakhter
 BDK-100 120, BDK-104 146, Alexandr Tortcev 062, Petr Ilyichnev 044
 Nikolay Vilkov 068, Nikolay Filchenkov 142 (as of 1990)



LST (19)



3 Project 775 NATO: Ropucha
 Olenegorskiy Gornyyk 012, Kondopoga 027, Aleksandr Otrakovskiy 031
9 Project 775/II NATO: Ropucha II
 Osl'yabya 066, BDK-98 055, Minsk 127, Kaliningrad 102
 Georgiy Pobedonosets 016, Aleksandr Shabalin 110
 Caesar Kunikov 158, Novocherkassk 142, Yamal 156
3 Project 775M NATO: Ropucha III
 Azov 151, Peresvet 077, Korolev 130



4 Project 1171 Tapir NATO: Alligator
 Saratov 150, Orsk 148, Nikolay Vilkov 081, Nikolay Filchenkov 152




Is there a resurgent Russian naval threat 25 years after the collapse of the USSR? **LESS platforms but MORE missiles**

- ONLY **ONE** unit of a new class of SSN/SSGNs (designed in the 1980s) built in 25 years (7 more units are expected but according to 1992 projections they should all have been commissioned by now)
- The priority on a SSBN replacement program mating components of uncompleted or scrapped AKULA SSNs and OSCAR SSGNs: **FOUR UNITS COMPLETED**
- ONLY **ONE** unit of a new (failed) SSK design (LADA) still undergoing trials in the Northern fleet ; a STOP GAP resumption of KILO production with 3 UNITS so far
- NO NEW CRUISER/DESTROYER CLASSES SINCE 1991
- TWO NEW CLASSES OF FRIGATES (GORSHKOV, GRIGOROVITCH), WITH **THREE UNITS** COMPLETED SO FAR (ONE and TWO)
- The cruise missiles and submarines' deployments make the Russian Navy intimidating but it is an old fleet nearing 30 years of age with most platforms needing replacement or modernization



Russia's LCS:
- 4 missile corvettes classes and
- 2 ice-reinforced OPV classes all fitted with "KALIBR"/"ONIKS" as temporary substitutes for 2 classes of frigates halted by the Ukrainian embargo on gas turbines





Russia's future capabilities: beyond 2022





Future platforms to be expected: most fitted with KALIBR, ONIKS and later the ZIRCON hypersonic cruise missile: **YES, A GAME CHANGER...**

- 6 x GORSHKOV frigates to be completed by 2025 when Russia's production of gas turbines will permit
- 6 x 18 000 tons "Destroyer Leader" with the lead unit expected to be laid down in 2019
- 2 refurbished KIROV battle cruisers with 80 KALIBR/ONIKS/ZIRCON; 8 refurbished UDALOY destroyers
- 3/4 and 3/4 refurbished OSCAR SSGN and AKULA SSN with KALIBR/ONIKS
- 1 or 2 x 100 000 tons aircraft carriers after 2030
- 6 NEW CON KILO SSK for the Pacific Fleet
- Follow on SSN/SSGNs HUSKY Class and SSBNs
- Four classes of missile corvettes
- A replacement for MISTRAL

CHANGER...



ZIRCON hypersonic missile: **THE GAME CHANGER TO COME: will fit in the current VLS**



Cooperation with India on the BHRAMOS II Hypersonic missile

- A commercial venture
- A special relation with India that explains why Russia is sharing a revolutionary new technology
- as a side effect sharing the hypersonic technology with India contributes to contain China's naval rise



Understanding Russia's rationale

The 2000 and 2009 defense doctrines against interference in Russian affairs

With the Kosovo crisis, 30 March 1999, Russia announced its intention to deploy the main units of the Black Sea Fleet but failed to do so; in early July 1999, five Russian amphibious ships carrying elements of the Tula and Pskov airborne divisions deployed to Thessaloniki to strengthen the Russian peacekeeping force in Kosovo.

Published in 2000 and 2009, the second and third military doctrines of the Russian Federation repeated the defensive principles stated in the text first published in 1993.

They added “external threats” including "interference in Russia's internal affairs, attempts to ignore Russian interests in the resolution of international conflicts, changing the regional balances on the Russian borders... technical or psychological information operations that damage the military security of Russia and its allies and discriminatory attitudes against Russian citizens in foreign countries "



The 2001 Maritime Doctrine against NATO's expansion and supporting the development of the Russian Far East

Written by the admirals Kuroyedov (then Commander of the Navy and author of a thesis defended in the presence of President Putin) and Zakharenko, the "maritime doctrine until 2020" is published on August 27th, 2001.

For the Atlantic, this doctrine notes that the determining factor is NATO's expansion; for the Asia Pacific, it explains that "... The Russian Far East has huge resources ... but it is sparsely populated and isolated ... These contradictions are accompanied by an intense military and economic development among neighbors in the Asia Pacific ... The objective is... accelerating social and economic development of the Russian Far East through the intensification of maritime activity by the Russian Federation ..."



The December 31st 2015 Military Doctrine: RUSSIA'S THREAT PERCEPTION: NATO EXPANSION

- *15. Нарастание силового потенциала Организации Североатлантического договора (НАТО) и наделение ее глобальными функциями, реализуемыми в нарушение норм международного права, активизация военной деятельности стран блока, дальнейшее расширение альянса, приближение его военной инфраструктуры к российским границам создают угрозу национальной безопасности.*

[15. The capacity-building of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), its global role carried out in violation of international law, the intensification of its military activities, the further expansion of the alliance and its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders, pose a threat to national security].

- *Возможности поддержания глобальной и региональной стабильности существенно снижаются при размещении в Европе, Азиатско-Тихоокеанском регионе и на Ближнем Востоке компонентов системы противоракетной обороны США, в условиях практической реализации концепции "глобального удара", развертывания стратегических неядерных систем высокоточного оружия, а также в случае размещения оружия в космосе.*

[The possibilities of maintaining global and regional stability are significantly reduced with the deployment of components for a US missile defense system in Europe, Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, to implement the concept of "global strike" together with strategic nonnuclear precision weapon systems and the deployment of weapons in space.]

RUSSIA'S THREAT PERCEPTION: WESTERN INTERVENTIONISM AND ITS DESTABILISING EFFECT

- *18. Практика свержения легитимных политических режимов, провоцирования внутригосударственных нестабильности и конфликтов получает все более широкое распространение. Наряду с сохраняющимися очагами напряженности на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке, в Африке, Южной Азии, на Корейском полуострове появляются новые "горячие точки", расширяются зоны, не контролируемые властями каких-либо государств. Территории вооруженных конфликтов становятся базой для распространения терроризма, межнациональной розни, религиозной вражды, иных проявлений экстремизма. Появление террористической организации, объявившей себя "Исламским государством", и укрепление ее влияния стали результатом политики двойных стандартов, которой некоторые государства придерживаются в области борьбы с терроризмом.*

[18. The practice of overthrowing the legitimate political regimes, provoking domestic instability and conflict is becoming more widespread. Along with the persistent hotbeds of tension in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula, new "hot spots", zones not controlled by the government of any State, are expanding. **The territories of armed conflicts are a source for spreading terrorism,** ethnic hatred, religious hatred, and other manifestations of extremism. The emergence of a terrorist organization, the self-proclaimed "Islamic state", and the strengthening of its influence are the result of the policy of double standards, which some States follow in their fight against terrorism].

Mikhail Gorbachev's analysis

“We were ready to build a new security architecture for Europe. But after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Warsaw Pact, NATO forgot all its promises. It became more of a political than a military organization. NATO decided it would be an organization that intervenes anywhere on “humanitarian grounds.” We have by now seen intervention not only in Yugoslavia, but in Iraq — intervention without any mandate or permission from the United Nations. Americans have treated us without proper respect. Russia is a serious partner. We are a country with a tremendous history, with diplomatic experience. It is an educated country that has contributed much to science. The Soviet Union used to be not just an adversary but also a partner of the West. There was some balance in that system.”

The view from George Kennan, alias Mr. X, the father
of “containment”

“Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era. Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the Cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.”

The New York Times, 1997

The view from John Mattlock, the last US Ambassador to the USSR

JACK MATLOCK JR.: *“Well, I think that what we have seen is a reaction, in many respects, to a long history of what the Russian government, the Russian president and many of the Russian people—most of them—feel has been a pattern of American activity that has been hostile to Russia and has simply disregarded their national interests. They feel that having thrown off communism, having dispensed with the Soviet Empire, that the U.S. systematically, from the time it started expanding NATO to the east, without them, and then using NATO to carry out what they consider offensive actions about another country—in this case, Serbia—a country which had not attacked any NATO member, and then detached territory from it—this is very relevant now to what we’re seeing happening in Crimea—and then continued to place bases in these countries, to move closer and closer to borders, and then to talk of taking Ukraine, most of whose people didn’t want to be a member of NATO, into NATO, and Georgia. Now, this began an intrusion into an area which the Russians are very sensitive. Now, how would Americans feel if some Russian or Chinese or even West European started putting bases in Mexico or in the Caribbean, or trying to form governments that were hostile to us? You know, we saw how we virtually went ballistic over Cuba. And I think that we have not been very attentive to what it takes to have a harmonious relationship with Russia.”*

Conclusions

- Russia's new land attack missiles are by no means a surprise; they had been advertised on Arms shows since Abu Dhabi IDEX 1993. Their conception dates back from the 1980s when the USSR was trying to develop universal missiles with an analog to the US conventional TOMAHAWK.
- With a shrinking fleet and financial and technical difficulties (gas turbines), Russia is starting a major life extension program that will allow 30 years old surface and submarine platforms to live another 15 years and carry as many as 20 to 80 VLS. At the same time, Russia is accelerating the production of corvettes fitted with 8 missiles each and KIL0 submarines for the Pacific Fleet (6 units).
- Although the Russian Navy is obsolescent, this massive re-equipment constitutes a "game changer" and a significant challenge for Western navies. Despite its comfortable advantage of 80 AEGIS platforms, the USN should cancel the plan to transform the inappropriate L(C)S into a frigate. The USN should actually get some inspiration from the well armed Russian new corvettes.
- Despite its apparent alignment with China, Russia contributes through its technology transfers to India and through its sales of supersonic missiles to Vietnam and a lesser extent Indonesia to contain China's naval rise
- Yet, despite the fact that Russia is challenging Western forces in the air and on the high seas, Moscow still calls the Western nations "partners" and enmity is not inevitable.
- The attendees may ask themselves if they have ever read the various Russian military and maritime doctrines issued in 2000, 2001, 2009, 2010 and 2015. If not, they can understand the roots of the problems with Russia: despite very specific warnings and strategic messaging by Russia in extensive papers unheard of in Soviet times, the West did not pay any attention to Russia's strategic concerns over NATO's eastern expansion.