Posters being presented at MSC 2014 (as of May 16, 2014)
Japan as a Sea Power, Strategy, Doctrine, and Capabilities, 2004-2013
MSC 2014 Theme: The Naval Rebalance to the Pacific
Author: Dr. Alessio Patalano, Dept. of War Studies, King’s College, London, United Kingdom
This paper explores how Japanese maritime strategy, doctrine and capabilities evolved throughout the past decade. It argues that Japan is East Asia’s sea power, questioning scholarly assumptions that the country’s eroding quantitative advantage over a ‘rising maritime China’ is shorthand for a ‘declining’, or a ‘reluctant’ naval actor. Poor in natural resources and featuring an export-oriented economy, Japan’s choice to pursue a degree of sea power is not a matter of choice, but a strategic imperative. Against this background, the paper focuses on how the Japanese navy, known as the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force of JMSDF, adapted its strategic thinking, doctrine, and force structures to meet an evolving security environment within given normative, political, and financial constraints. Fully aware of the vital importance of constant and safe access to international shipping, the Japanese navy endeavoured to review its sea lanes strategy, seeking to adopt a more pro-active posture in key geographic areas positioned along the country’s main trading arteries. The navy sought to combine its ASW and amphibious cores designed to be deployed primarily in the Sea of Japan and in the East China Sea, with expeditionary capabilities for the conduct of disaster relief and security missions in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Eastern Coast of Africa. Crucially, the main changes to doctrine and force structures suggest that the country’s evolution is designed to favour its integration into the international maritime order as East Asia’s most mature sea power.
Hook, Line and Sink Her; Fish Security and the Pacific Ocean MSC 2014 Theme: Navigating Maritime Disputes
Author: CMDR Sean Andrews, Navy Strategic Command, Royal Australian Navy, Canberra, Australia
This paper draws upon doctoral research that examines securitising fishing in the Pacific Ocean. Some arguments¸ stress the importance for threats to the environmental to be left off any security agenda as it is inappropriate for states to allocate military assets for non-military global issues. This is where reality challenges rhetoric. Today¸ states are applying the apparatus of security to resource protection with much vigour. Australia¸ for example¸ in the last three decades has advanced from an ad hoc patrol boat mission, to an integrated air and surface response group with technically advanced aircraft, dedicated ships and headquarters· Drawing upon broader doctoral research examining Australia’s four oceans¸ this paper proposes an interdisciplinary approach using International Relations¸ Fisheries management – regulation and maritime strategy within the maritime domain of the Pacific Ocean to pursue a better understanding of achieving sustainable resource policy and capability alternatives to enable de-securitisation.
Postmodern Navy to Transnational Adaptive Navy : Positive Peace with Borderless Institutional Network
MSC 2014 Theme: The Future of Navies
Author: Lieutenant Serkan Tezgel, Turkish Naval War College, Istanbul, Turkey
Effectively managing threats and power that transcend national boundaries requires a reformulation from the traditional postmodern navy to an adaptive and institutional transnational navy. By analyzing existing soft power concept, post modern navy and sea power, this study proposes the transnational navy, founded on the triangle of main attributes of transnational companies, ”Global Competitiveness, Local Responsiveness, Worldwide Learning and Innovation Sharing”, a new model which will lead to a positive peace with institutional network. This transnational model necessitates ”Transnational Navies” to help establish peace with collective and transnational understanding during a transition period ”Reactive Postmodern Navy” has been experiencing. In this regard it is fairly claimed that a new paradigm shift will revolve around sea power to establish good order at sea with collective and collaborative initiatives and bound to breed new theories and ideas in the forthcoming years. However, there are obstacles to overcome. Postmodern navies, currently shaped by ”Collective Maritime Security” and ”Collective Defense” concepts, can not abandon reactive applications and acts. States deploying postmodern navies to realize their policies on international platforms and sea power structures shaped by the axis of countries’ absolute interests resulted in multipolar alliances and coalitions, but the establishment of the peace. These obstacles can be categorized into three tiers in establishing a transnational model navy: Strategic, Organizational and Management challenges.
Russia’s shipbuilding program and it implications for the Russian Pacific Fleet
MSC 2014 Theme: The Naval Rebalance to the Pacific
Author: Prof. Alexandre Sheldon Duplaix, service historique de la defense avenue de Paris vincennes 94300, France
During the first two decades after the end of the Cold War Russia’s Naval Order of battle has been divided by 8 while an aging shipbuilding industry with major suppliers now in Ukraine struggled to deliver 11 nuclear attack submarines, 1 battle cruiser, 4 destroyers and 2 frigates laid down before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since then, Russia has only completed 3 strategic, 2 nuclear attack and 2 conventional submarines, as well as 7 light frigates. Following the guidance of a 2001 maritime doctrine that calls for a defensive navy capable of deterring actions by an expanding NATO that ignores Russia’s interests, defeating separatism and asserting claims in the Caspian Sea and the Arctic, Russia hopes to take delivery in the next 5 years of 3 more strategic submarines, 1 nuclear and 6 conventional attack submarines, 2 helicopter carriers, a refurbished battle cruiser, 10 frigates as well as about 30 auxiliary vessels including 8 transports and rescue displacing more than 5000 tons and ice capable. In 2016, Russia should also lay down its first major surface combatant since the 1980s, a 10 000 tons destroyer while initiating the R&D for an electromagnetic catapult destined to an aircraft carrier replacement. Yet this program will not replace the existing fleet. Disillusioned with a West that failed to include her in a scheme to balance China, Moscow simulates a strategic partnership with Beijing but the shrinking Russian Pacific Fleet is no longer a match for its neighbor.
Small Land, Big Issue: the Geostrategic Significance of the Indian Ocean Small Islands
MSC 2014 Theme: The Naval Rebalance to the Pacific [Indo-Pacific Region] / Developments in the Indian Ocean
Author: Christian Bouchard, Full Professor, Laurentian University (Sudbury, ON, Canada)
Historically, small islands have played a very significant geostrategic role in the Indian Ocean. Their location at sea and isolation from the continental landmasses can provide a very advantageous position to armed forces for a wide range of activities, including, but not limited to, defence, surveillance, support and power projection from sea to land. Far from fading away, the geostrategic interest for the Indian Ocean small islands has been greatly renewed since the beginning of the 21st century in conjunction with the fact that the Indian Ocean Region is of growing importance in global geopolitics and the world economy. This is certainly true for the United States and Diego Garcia (U.S. Navy Support Facility Diego Garcia), as well as for France and its Indian Ocean islands (FAZOI – Forces Armées de la Zone Sud de l’Océan Indien / French armed forces in the Southern Indian Ocean Zone) or for India and its island territories (INS Dweeprakshak in Lakshadweep, Andaman and Nicobar Command). But many other small islands are now fully integrated into strategic planning with some already in use for ongoing military operations, such as the Seychelles, Mauritius, the Maldives, Myanmar’s Coco Islands, and Australia’s Cocos (Keeling) Islands. This paper examines how the United States, France, India and Australia are securing and even developing their positions in the Indian Ocean small islands while China and even Russia are seeking new facilities in the region.
